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1PARANOID READING AND REPARATIVE READING; OR, YOU’RE
SO PARANOID YOU PROBABLY THINK THIS INTRODUCTION IS
ABOUT YOU
EVE KOSOFSKY SEDGWICK
Novel Gazing: Queer Readings in Fiction came together unprogrammatically. Invited by the
journal Studies in the Novel to edit a special issue, I asked forty or so writers I admire
whether they could find room on their agendas to write something that would, loosely speak-
ing, convene the rubrics "novel" and "queer." I felt more than fortunate in the response, when
these startlingly imaginative essays started tumbling in at a rate that soon overfilled the jour-
nal - and didn't slow down even then.
Unmistakably the essays pointed toward a book. But excited by the force, the origi-
nality, and in many cases the beauty of these pieces, I still found it difficult to articulate more
than a negative sense of what kind of a moment they might collectively represent in queer
theory or in literary criticism. Clearly and queerly enough, they share a relaxed, unseparatist
hypothesis of the much to be gained by refraining from a priori oppositions between queer
texts (or authors) and non-queer ones, or female ones and male. In fact, the list of damaging
a priori oppositions to which these essays quiet1y, collectively find alternative approaches is
very impressive: the authors transmit new ways of knowing that human beings are also ma-
chines, are also animals; that an ethic or aesthetic of truthtelling need not depend on any
reified notion of truth; that the materiality of human bodies, of words, and of economic pro-
duction may misrepresent but cannot simply eclipse one another; that pleasure, grief, ex-
citement, boredom, satisfaction are the substance of politics rather than their antithesis; that
affect and cognition are not very distant processes; that visual perception need not be con-
ceptually isolated from the other four bodily senses; that gender differentiation is crucial to
human experience but in no sense coextensive with it; that it's well to attend intimately to
literary texts, not because their transformative energies either transcend or disguise the
coarser stuff of ordinary being, but because those energies are the stuff of ordinary being.
If nothing else, the negative specifications of these essays do seem to add up to a
surprising discip1inary generalization: given how queer theory and literary criticism are cur-
2rently structured, it's notable that among seventeen diverse, psychologically searching, very
real-world-oriented essays on texts from the past two centuries, not a single one is working
directly from inside Freud or Lacan, and few, either, seem to owe much to the narrative and
research protocols that typify the New Historicism. Though passionate, they are also not par-
ticularly polemical, and they don't greatly feature the disciplining of previous errors of theory
or interpretation. If anything, the expansive length of several of the essays seems to reflect a
distance from any of those master-figures or master-discourses to which theoretical appeals
can today be made in shorthand.
I wouldn't, beforehand, have characterized this particular intellectual moment as likely
to offer remarkable resources for a fresh, deroutinized sense of accountability to the real.
Live and learn. By accountability to the real I mean in the first place the many, diverse, but
very marked turns these essays take away from existing accounts of how "one" should read,
and back toward a grappling with the recalcitrant, fecund question of how one does. It might
even be true to say that the psychological/political ambitions of many of the essays take the
form of a similar series of turns: from the nonsensical but seemingly uncircumnavigable
question of how people should feel to the much harder ones of how they do and of how feel-
ings change. Interestingly, it's also the repeated turn away from the deontological project of
“ought” that seems to characterize the unmistakable, though often tacit, ethical gravity and
specificity of this work.
As for its queer specificity, I will discuss below why that seems to emerge throughout
the essays in such varied and radically contingent forms. I don't think any of these essays
would have been writable - thinkable - before or without the gay/lesbian studies and queer
theory movements in literary criticism; indeed almost all the authors, who range from current
graduate students to foundational figures in these movements, are steeped in those prob-
lematics and sensibilities. Yet what seems least settled is any predetermined idea about
what makes the queerness of a queer reading. Often these readings begin from or move
toward sites of same-sex, interpersonal eroticism - but not necessarily so. It seems to me
that an often quiet, but very palpable presiding image here - a kind of genius loci for queer
reading – is the interpretive absorption of the child or adolescent whose sense of personal
queerness mayor may not (yet?) have resolved into a sexual specificity of proscribed object
choice, aim, site, or identification. Such a child - if she reads at all - is reading for important
news about herself, without knowing what form that news will take; with only the patchiest
familiarity with its codes; without, even, more than hungrily hypothesizing to what questions
this news may proffer an answer. The model of such reading is hardly the state of compla-
cent adequacy that Jonathan Culler calls "literary competence," but a much more specula-
tive, superstitious, and methodologically adventurous state where recognitions, pleasures,
and discoveries seep in only from the most stretched and ragged edges of one's compe-
tence.1
3Aside from the deroutinizing methodologies of these essays, what seems most haunt-
ingly to characterize them is how distant many of them are – from a certain stance of suspi-
cion or paranoia that is common the theoretical work whose disciplinary ambience surrounds
them. If the collection can be said to embody anyone, primary premise, it would be that a
closer, more respectful attention to past and present queer reading practices - the kind of
attention these essays, in their different ways, all embody - will show how the reservoir of
practices already in use crucially exceeds the theorizations of a consensual hermeneutic of
suspicion. Many of these pieces are, rightly and productively, incisive in their use of a me-
thodical suspicion; but what more unites them is a very different impulse and history, which
would be badly misrecognized under the currently available rubrics. In the remainder of this
essay - and, I must admit, at the risk of somewhat compromising the nonprogrammatic aes-
thetic of deontological reticence that otherwise seems to make the flavor of the volume - it is
the issue of paranoia and its alternatives that I would like to explore more fully.
Sometime back in the middle of the first decade of the AIDS epidemic, I was picking the
brains of a friend of mine, the activist scholar Cindy Patton, about the probable natural his-
tory of HIV. This was at a time when speculation was ubiquitous about whether the virus had
been deliberately engineered, or spread; whether HIV represe-nted a plot or experiment by
the U.S. military that had gotten out of control, or perhaps that was behaving exactly as it
was meant to. After hearing a lot from her about the geography and economics of the global
traffic in blood products, I finally, with some eagerness, asked Patton what she thought of
these sinister rumors about the virus's origin. "Any of the early steps in its spread could have
been either accidental or deliberate:” she said. "But I just have trouble getting interested in
that. I mean, even suppose we were sure of every element of a conspiracy: that the lives of
Africans and African Americans are worthless in the eyes of the United States; that gay men
and drug users are held cheap where they aren't actively hated; that the military deliberately
researches ways to kill noncombatants whom it sees as enemies; that people in power look
calmly on the likelihood of catastrophic environmental and population changes. Supposing
we were ever so sure of all those things - what would we know then that we don't already
know?"
In the years since that conversation, I've brooded a lot over this response from Pat-
ton. Aside from a certain congenial, stony pessimism, I think what I've found enabling about it
is that it suggests the possibility of unpacking, of disentangling from their impacted and over-
determined historical relation to each other, some of the separate elements of the intellectual
baggage that many of us carry around under a label like "the hermeneutic of suspicion." Pat-
ton's comment suggests that for someone to have an unmystified, angry view of large and
genuinely systemic opressions does not intrinsically or necessarily enjoin on that person any
specific train of epistemological or narrative consequences. To know that the origin or spread
4of HIV realistically might have resulted from a state-assisted conspiracy - such knowledge is,
it turns out, separable from the question of whether the energies of a given AIDS activist in-
tellectual or group might best be used in the tracing and exposure of such a possible plot.
They might, but then again, they might not. Though ethically very fraught, the choice is not
self-evident; whether or not to undertake this highly compelling tracing-and-exposure project
represents a strategic and local decision, not necessarily a categorical imperative. Patton's
response to me seemed to open a space for moving from the rather fixated question, "Is a
particular piece of knowledge true, and how can we now?" to the further questions, "What
does knowledge do - the pursuit of it, the having and exposing of it, the receiving-again of
knowledge of what one already knows? How, in short, is knowledge performative, and how
best does one move among its causes and effects?"
I suppose this ought to seem quite an unremarkable epiphany: that knowledge does
rather than simply is, it is by now very routine to discover. Yet it seems that a lot of the real
force of such discoveries has been blunted through the habitual practices of the same forms
of critical theory that have given such broad currency to the formulae themselves. In particu-
lar, it may be that the very productive critical habits embodied in what Paul Ricoeur memora-
bly called “hermeneutics of suspicion” - widespread critical habits indeed, perhaps by now
nearly synonymous with criticism itself – may have had an unintentionally stultifying side-
effect: they may have made it less rather than more possible to unpack the local, contingent
relations between any given piece of knowledge and its narrative/epistemological entailments
for the seeker, knower, or teller.
      Ricoeur introduced the category of the "hermeneutic of suspicion" to describe the posi-
tion of Marx, Nietzsche, Freud, and their intellecual offspring within a context that also in-
cluded such alternative disciplinary hermeneutics as the philological and theological "herme-
neutic of recovery of meaning."2 His intent in offering the former of these formulations was
descriptive and taxonomic rather than imperative. In the context of recent U.S. critical theory,
however, where Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud by themselves are taken as constituting a pretty
sufficient genealogy for the mainstream of New Historicist, deconstructive, feminist, queer,
and psychoanalytic criticism, to apply a "hermeneutic of suspicion" is, I believe, widely un-
derstood as a mandatory injunction rather than a possibility among other possibilities. The
phrase now has something like the sacred status of Fredric Jameson's "Always historicize" -
and, like that one, it fits oddly into its new position in the tablets of the Law. Always his-
toricize? What could have less to do with historicizing than the commanding, atemporal ad-
verb "always"? It reminds me of the common bumper stickers that instruct people in other
cars to "Question Authority." Excellent advice, perhaps wasted on anyone who does what-
ever they're ordered to do by a strip of paper glued to the bumper of an automobile! The im-
perative framing will do funny things to a hermeneutic of suspicion.
5Not surprisingly, the methodological centrality of suspicion to current critical practice
has involved a concomitant privileging of the concept of paranoia. In the last paragraphs of
Freud's essay on the paranoid Dr. Schreber, there is discussion of what Freud considers a
"striking similarity" between Schreber's systematic persecutory delusion and Freud's own
theory. Freud was indeed later to generalize, famously, that "the delusions of paranoiacs
have an unpalatable external similarity and internal kinship to the systems of our philoso-
phers" - among whom he included himself.3 For all his slyness, it may be true that the puta-
tive congruence between paranoia and theory was unpalatable to Freud; if so, however, it is
no longer viewed as unpalatable. The articulation of such a congruence may have been in-
evitable, at any rate; as Ricoeur notes, "For Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud, the fundamental
category of consciousness is the relation hidden-shown or, if you prefer, simulated-
manifested. . . . Thus the distinguishing characteristic of Marx, Freud, and Nietzsche is the
general hypothesis concerning both the process of false consiousness and the method of
deciphering. The two go together, since the man of suspicion carries out in reverse the work
of falsification of the man of guile."4 The man of suspicion double-bluffing the man of guile: in
the hands of thinkers after Freud, paranoia has by now candidly become less a diagnosis
than a prescription. In a world where no one need be delusional to find evidence of systemic
oppression, to theorize out of anything but a paranoid critical stance has come to seem na-
ive, pious, or complaisant. I myself have no wish to return to the use of "paranoid" as a
pathologizing diagnosis; but it seems to me a great loss whan paranoid inquiry comes to
seem entirely coextensive with critical theoretical inquiry, rather than being viewed as one
kind of cognitive/affective theorefical practice among other, alternative kinds.
Even aside from the prestige that now attaches to a hermeneutic of suspicion in criti-
cal theory as a whole, queer studies in particular has had a distinctive history of intimacy with
the paranoid imperative. Freud, of course, traced every instance of paranoia to the repres-
sion of specifically same-sex desire, whether in women or in men. The traditional, homo-
phobic psychoanalytic use that has generally been made of Freud's association has been to
pathologize homosexuals as paranoid, or to consider paranoia a distinctively homosexual
disease. In Homosexual Desire, however, a 1972 book translated into English in 1978, Guy
Hocquenghem returned to Freud's formulations in order to draw from them a conclusion that
would not reproduce this damaging non sequitur. If paranoia reflects the repression of same-
sex desire, Hocquenghem reasoned, then paranoia is a uniquely privileged site for illuminat-
ing not homosexuality itself, as in the Freudian tradition, but rather precisely the mechanisms
of homophobic and heterosexist enforcement against it.5 What is illuminated by an under-
standing of paranoia is not how homosexuality works, but how homophobia and heterosex-
ism work - in'short, if one understands these oppressions to be systemic, how the world
works.
6Paranoia, thus, became by the mid-198os a privileged object of antihomophobic the-
ory. How did it sread so quickly from that status to being its uniquely sanctioned methodol-
ogy? I have been looking back into my own writing of the 198os as well as that of some other
critics, trying to retrace that transition - one that seems worthy of remark now but seemed at
the time, I think, the most natural move in the world. Part of the explanation lies in a property
of paranoia itself: simply put, paranoia tends to be contagious. More specifically, paranoia is
drawn toward and tends to construct symmetrical relations, and in particular symmetrical
epistemologies. As Leo Bersani writes, "To inspire interest is to be guaranteed a paranoid
reading, just as we must inevitably be suspicious of the interpretations we inspire. Paranoia
is an inescapable interpretive doubling of presence."6 It sets a thief (and if necessary, be-
comes one) to catch a thief; it mobilizes guile against suspicion, suspicion against guile; "it
takes one to know one." A paranoid friend, who believes I am reading her mind, knows this
from reading mine; also a suspicious writer, she is always turning up at crime scenes of pla-
giarism, indifferently as perpetrator or as victim; a litigious colleague as well, she not only
imagines me to be as familiar with the laws of libel as she is, but eventually makes me be-
come so. (All these examples, by the way, are fictitious.)
Given that paranoia seems to have a peculiarly intimate relation to the phobic dynam-
ics around homosexuality, then, it may have been structurally inevitable that the reading
practices that became most available and fruitful in antihomophobic work would often in turn
have been paranoid ones. There must have been historical as well as structural reasons for
this development, however, since it is less easy to account on structural terms for the fre-
quent privileging of paranoid methodologies in recent non-queer critical projects such as
feminist theory, psychoanalytic theory, deconstruction, Marxist criticism, or the New Histori-
cism. One recent discussion of paranoia invokes "a popular maxim of the late 1960s: 'Just
because you're paranoid doesn't mean they're not out to get you.' "7 And in fact it seems
quite plausible to me that some version of this axiom (perhaps "Even a paranoid can have
enemies," uttered by Henry Kissinger!)8 is so indelibly inscribed in the brains of us baby-
boomers that it offers us the continuing illusion of possessing a special insight into the epis-
temologies of enmity. My impression, again, is that, we are liable to produce this constative
formulation as fiercely as if it had a self-evident imperative force: the notation that even para-
noid people have enemies is wielded as if its absolutely necessary corollary were the injunc-
tion, " - so you can never be paranoid enough."
But the truth-value of the original axiom, assuming it to be true, doesn't actually make
a paranoid imperative self-evident. Learning that "just because you're paranoid doesn't mean
you don't have enemies," somebody might deduce that being paranoid is not an effective
way to get rid of enemies. Rather than concluding " - so you can never be paranoid enough, "
this person might instead be moved to reflect, " - but then, just because you have enemies
doesn't mean you have to be paranoid." That is to say, once again: for someone to have an
7unmystified view of systemic oppressions does not intrinsically or necessarily enjoin on that
person any specific train of epistemological or narrative consequences. To be other than
paranoid (and of course we'll need to define this term much more carefully) - to practice other
than paranoid forms of knowing does not, in itself, entail a denial of the reality or gravity of
enmity or oppression.
How are we to understand paranoia in such a way as to situate it as one kind of epis-
temological practice among other, alternative ones? Besides Freud's, the most usable formu-
lations for this purpose would seem to be those of Melanie Klein and (to the extent that para-
noia represents an affective as well as cognitive mode) Silvan Tomkins. In Klein, I find par-
ticularly congenial her use of the concept of positions – the schizoid/paranoid position, the
depressive position - as opposed to, for example, normatively ordered stages, stable struc-
tures, or diagnostic personality types. As Hinshelwood writes in his indispensable Dictionary
of Kleinian Thought, "The term 'position' describes the characteristic posture that the ego
takes up with respect to its objects. . . [Klein] wanted to convey, with the idea of position a
much more flexible to-and-fro process between one and the other than is normally meant by
regression to fixation points in the developmental phases.”9 The flexible to-and-fro movement
implicit in Kleinian positions will be useful for my purpose of discussing paranoid and repara-
tive critical practices, not as theoretical ideologies (and certainly not as stable personality
types of critics), but as changing and heterogeneous relational stances.
The greatest interest of Klein's concept lies, it seems to me, in her seeing the para-
noid position always in the oscillatory context of a very different possible one, the depressive
position, For Klein's infant or adult, the paranoid position - understandably marked by hatred,
envy, and anxiety - is a position of terrible alertness to the dangers posed by the hateful and
envious part-objects that one defensively projects into, carves out of, and ingests from the
world around one. By contrast, the depressive position is an anxiety-mitigating achievement
that the infant or adult only sometimes, and often only briefly, succeeds in inhabiting: this is
the position from which it is possible in turn to use one's own resources to assemble or "re-
pair" the murderous part-objects into something like a whole - though not, and may I empha-
size this, not necessarily like any preexisting whole. Once assembled to one's own specifica-
tions, the more satisfying object is available both to be identified with and to offer one nour-
ishment and comfort in turn. Among Klein's names for the reparative process is love.10
Given the instability and mutual inscription built into the Kleinian notion of positions, I
am also, in the present project, interested in doing justice to .the powerful reparative prac-
tices that, I am convinced infuse self-avowedly paranoid critical projects; as well as to the
paranoid exigencies that are often necessary for non-paranoid knowing and utterance. For
example, Patton's calm response to me about the origins of HIV drew on a lot of research,
her own and other people's, much of which required to be paranoiacally structured.
8For convenience's sake, I'll borrow my critical examples as I proceed from two influ-
ential studies of the past decade, one roughly psychoanalytic and the other roughly New His-
toricist - but I do so for more than the sake of convenience, since both are books (Judith But-
ler's Gender Trouble and D. A. Miller's The Novel and the Police) whose centrality to the de-
velopment of my own thought, and that of the critical movements that most interest me, are
examples of their very remarkable force and exemplarity. Each, as well, is interestingly lo-
cated in a tacit or ostensibly marginal, but in hinsight originary and authorizing, relation to
different strains of queer theory. Finally, I draw a sense of permission from the fact that nei-
ther book is any longer very representative of the most recent work of either author, so that
observations about the reading practices of either book may, I hope, escape being glued as if
allegorically to the name of the author.
I would like to begin by setting outside the scope of this discussion any overlap be-
tween paranoia per se on the one hand, and on the other hand the states variously called
dementia praecox (by Kraepelin), schizophrenia (by Bleuler), or more generally, delusionality
or psychosis. As Laplanche and Pontalis note, the history of psychiatry has attempted vari-
ous mappings of this overlap: "Kraepelin differentiates clearly between paranoia on the one
hand and the paranoid form of dementia praecox on the other; Bleuler treats paranoia as a
sub-category of dementia praecox, or the group of schizophrenias; as for Freud, he is quite
prepared to see certain so-called paranoid forms of dementia praecox brought under the
head of paranoia. . . . [For example, Schreber's] case of 'paranoid dementia' is essentially a
paranoia proper [and therefore not a form of schizophrenia] in Freud's eyes."11 In Klein's later
writings, meanwhile, the occurrence of psychotic-like mental events is seen as universal in
both children and adults, so that mechanisms such as paranoia have a clear ontological pri-
ority over diagnostic categories such as dementia. The reason I want to insist in advance on
this move is, once again, to try and hypothetically disentangle the question of truth-value
from the question of performative effect. I am saying that the main reasons for questioning
paranoid practices are other than the possibility that their suspicions can be delusional.
Concomitantly, some of the main reasons for practicing paranoid strategies may be
other than the possibility that they offer unique access to true knowledge. They represent a
way, among other ways, of seeking, finding, and organizing knowledge. Paranoia knows
some things well and others poorly. I'd like to undertake now something like a composite
sketch of what I mean by paranoia in this connection - not as a tool of differential diagnosis,
but anyway as a tool for better seeing differentials of practice. My main headings will be:
Paranoia is anticipatory.
Paranoia is reflexive and mimetic.
Paranoia is a strong theory.
Paranoia is a theory of negative affects.
9Paranoia places its faith in exposure.
(I) That paranoia is anticipatory is clear from every account and theory of the phe-
nomenon. The first imperative of paranoia is "There must be no bad surprises," and indeed
the aversion to surprise seems to be what cements the intimacy between paranoia and
knowledge per se, including both epistemophilia and skepticism. D. A. Miller notes in The
Novel and the Police that "Surprise. . . is preciselv what the paranoid seeks to eliminate, but
it is also what, in the event, he survives by reading as a frightening incentive: he can never
be paranoid enough."12
The unidirectionally future-oriented vigilance of paranoia generates, paradoxically, a
complex relation to tempora1ity that burrows both backward and forward: because there
must be no bad surprises, and because  to learn of the possibility of a bad surprise would
itself constitute a bad surprise, paranoia requires thatbad news be always already known. As
Miller's analysis also suggests, the temporal progress and regress of paranoia are, in princi-
ple, infinite. Hence perhaps, I would suggest, Butler's repeated and scouringly thorough
demonstrations in Gender Trouble that there can have been no moment prior to the imposi-
tion of the totalizing Law of gender difference; hence her unresting vigilance for traces in
other theorists' writing of nostalgia for such an impossible prior moment. No time could be too
early for one's having-already-known, for its having already-been-inevitable, that something
bad would happen; and no loss could be too far in the future to need to be preemptively dis-
counted.
(2) In noting, as I have already, the contagious tropism of paranoia toward symmetri-
cal epistemologies, I have relied on the double senses of .paranoia as reflexive and mimetic.
Paranoia seems to require to be imitated in order to be understood; and it, in turn, seems to
understand only by imitation. Paranoia proposes both " Anything you can do [to me] I can do
worse," and " Anything you can do [to me] I can do first" - to myself.  In The Novel and the
Police, D. A. Miller is much more explicit than Freud in embracing the twin propositions that
one understands paranoia only by oneself practicing paranoid knowing, and that the way
paranoia has of understanding anything is by imitating and embodying it. That paranoia re-
fuses to be only either a way of knowing or a thing known, but is characterized by an insis-
tent tropism toward occupying both positions, is wittily dramatized from the opening page of
this definitive study of paranoia: a foreword titled "But Officer. . ." begins with an always-
already-second-guessing sentence about how "Even the blandest ( or bluffest) 'scholarly
work' fears getting into trouble," including trouble "with the adversaries whose particular at-
tacks it keeps busy anticipating" (vii; emphasis in original) . As the book's final paragraph
notes about David Copperfield, Miller too "everywhere intimates a. . . pattern in which the
subject constitutes himself 'against' discipline by assuming that discipline in his own name"
(220), or even his own body (191).
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It seems no wonder, then, that paranoia, once the topic is broached in a nondiagnos-
tic context, would seem to grow like a crystal in a hypersaturated solution, blotting out any
sense of the possibility of alternative ways of understanding or things to understand. I will say
more later on about some implications of the status of paranoia as - in this sense - inevitably
a "strong theory. " What may be even more important is how severely the mimeticism of
paranoia circumscribes its potential as a medium of political or cultural struggle. As I pointed
out in a 1986 essay (in which my implicit reference was, as it happens, to one of the essays
later collected in The Novel and the Police), "The problem here is not simply that paranoia is
a form of love, for - in a certain language - what is not? The problem is rather that, of all
forms of love, paranoia is the most ascetic, the love that demands leas t from its object. . . .
The gorgeous narrative work done by the Foucaulian paranoid, transforming the simultane-
ous chaoses of institutions into a consecutive, drop-dead-elegant diagram of spiralling es-
capes and recaptures, is also the paranoid subject's proffer of himself and his cognitive tal-
ent, now ready for anything it can present in the way of blandishment or violence, to an or-
der-of-things morcelé that had until then lacked only narratability, a body, cognition."13
At the risk of offering a coarse reduction, I'd suggest that this anticipatory, mimetic
mechanism may also shed light on a striking feature of recent feminist and queer uses of
psychoanalysis. Lacan aside, few actual psychoanalysts would dream of being as rigorously
insistent as are many oppositional theorists - of whom Butler is very far from the most single-
minded - in asserting the inexorable, irreducible, uncircumnavigable, omnipresent centrality,
at every psychic juncture, of the facts (however factitious) of "sexual difference" and "the
phallus." From such often tautological work, it would be hard to learn that - from Freud on-
ward, including for example the later writings of Melanie Klein - the history of psychoanalytic
thought offers richly divergent, heterogeneous tools for thinking about aspects of person-
hood, consciousness, affect, filiation, social dynamics, and sexuality that, while relevant to
the experince of gender and queerness, are often not centrally organized around "sexual
difference" at all. Not that they are necessarily prior to "sexual difference": they may simply
be conceptualized as somewhere to the side of it, tangentially or contingently related or even
rather unrelated to it.
Seemingly, the reservoir of such thought and speculation could make an important
resource for theorists commited to thinking about human lives otherwise than through the
prejudicious gender reifications that are common in psychoanalysis, as in other projects of
modern philosophy and science. What has happened instead, I think, is something like the
following. First, through what might be called a process of vigilant scanning, feminists and
queers have rightly understood that no topic or area of psychoanalytic thought can be de-
clared a priori immune to the influence of such gender reifications. Second, however - and it
seems to me, unnecessarily and often damagingly - the lack of such a priori immunity, the
absence of any guaranteed-nonprejudicial point of beginning for feminist thought within psy-
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choanalysis, has led to the widespread adoption by some thinkers of an anticipatory mimetic
strategy whereby a certain, stylized violence of sexual differentiation must always be pre-
sumed or self-assumed - even, where necessary, imposed - simply on the ground that it can
never be finally ruled out. (1 don't want to suggest, in using the word "mimetic," that these
uses of psychoanalytic gender categories need be either uncritical of, or identical to, the
originals: Judith Butler, among others, has taught us a much less deadening use of "mi-
metic.") But, for example, in this post-Lacanian tradition, psychoanalytic thought that is not in
the first place centrally organized around phallic "sexual difference" must seemingly be trans-
lated, with however distorting results, into that language before it can be put to any other
theoretical use. The contingent possibilities of thinking otherwise than through "sexual differ-
ence" are subordinated to the paranoid imperative that, if the violence of such gender reifica-
tion cannot be definitively halted in advance, it must at least never arrive on any conceptual
scene as a surprise. In a paranoid view, it is more dangerous for such reification ever to be
unanticipated than often to be unchallenged.
(3) It is for reasons like these that, in the systems-theory-influenced work of the psy-
chologist Silvan Tomkins, paranoia is offered as the example par excellence of what Tomkins
refers to as “strong affect theory” -  in this case, a strong humiliation or humiliation-fear the-
ory. His use of the term "strong theory" - indeed, his use of the term "theory" at all - has
something of a double valence. Tomkins goes beyond Freud's reflection on possible similari-
ties between, say, paranoia and theory; by Tomkins's account, which is strongly marked by
early cybernetics' interest in feedback processes, all people's cognitive/affective lives are
organized according to alternative, changing, strategic and hypothetical affect theories. As a
result, there would be from the start no ontological difference between the theorizing acts of
a Freud and those of, say, one of his analysands. Tomkins does not suggest that there is no
meta-level of reflection in Freud's theory, but rather that affect itself, ordinary affect, while
irreducibly corporeal, is also centrally shaped, trough the feedback process, by its access to
just such theoretical meta-levels. In Tomkins, there is no distance at all between affect theory
in the sense of the important explicit theorizing some scientists and philosophers do around
affects, and affect theory in the sense of the largely tacit theorizing all people do in experi-
encing and trying to deal with their own and others' affects.
To call paranoia a "strong theory” is, then, at the same time to congratulate it as a big
achievement - it's a strong theory rather as, for Harold Bloom, Milton is a strong poet – but
also to classifyit.  It is one kind of affect theory among other possible kinds, and by Tomkins's
account, a number of interrelated affect theories of different kinds and strengths are likely to
constitute the mental life of any individual. Most pointedly, the contrast of strong theory in
Tomkins is with weak theory, and the contrast is not in every respect to the advantage of the
strong kind. The reach and reductiveness of strong theory - that is, its conceptual economy
or elegance - involve both assets and deficits. What Characterizes strong theory in Tomkins
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is not, after all, how well it avoids negative affect or finds positive affect, but the size and to-
pology of the domain that it organizes. "Any theory of wide generality," he writes,
is capable of accounting for a wide spectrum of phenomena which appear to be very
remote, one from the other, and from a common source. This is a commonly ac-
cepted criterion by which the explanatory power of any scientific theory can be evalu-
ated. To the extent to which the theory can account only for “near" phenomena, it is a
weak theory, little better than a description of the phenomena which it purports to ex-
plain. As it orders more and more remote phenomena to a single formulation, its
power grows. . . . A humiliation theory is strong to the extent to which it enables more
and more experiences to be accounted for as instances of humiliating experiences on
the one hand, or to the extent to which it enables more and more anticipation of such
contingencies before they actually happen."14
As this account suggests, far from becoming stronger through obviating or alleviating hu-
miliation, a humiliation theory becomes stronger exactly insofar as it fails to do so.15 Tom-
kins's conclusion is not that all strong theory is ineffective - indeed, it may grow to be only too
effective - but that "affect theory must be effective to be weak":
We can now see more clearly that although a restricted and weak theory may
not always successfully protect the individual against negative affect, it is diffi-
cult for it to remain weak unless it does so. Conversely, a negative affect theory
gains in strength, paradoxically, by virtue of the continuing failures of its strate-
gies to afford protection through successful avoidance of the experience of
negative affect. . . . It is the repeated and apparently uncontrollable spread of
the experience of negative affect which prompts the increasing strength of the
ideo-affective organization which we have called a strong affect theory. (2:323-
24)
An affect theory is, among other things, a mode of selective scanning and amplification; for
this reason, any affect theory risks being somewhat tautological, but because of its wide
reach and rigorous exclusiveness, a strong theory risks being strongly tautological.
We have said that there is over-organization in monopolistic humiliation theory. By
this we mean not only that there is excessive integration between sub-systems which
are normally more independent, but also that each sub-system is over-specialized in
the interests of minimizing the experience of humiliation. . . . The entire cognitive ap-
paratus is in a constant state of alert for possibilities, imminent or remote, ambiguous
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or clear.
Like any highly organized effort at detection, as little as possible is left to
chance. The radar antennae are placed wherever it seems possible the enemy may
attack. Intelligence officers may monitor even unlikely conversations if there is an
outside chance something relevant may be detected or if there is a chance that two
independent bits of information taken together may give indication of the enemy's in-
tentions. . . . But above all there is a highly organized way of interpreting information
so that what is possibly relevant can be quickly abstracted and magnified, and the
rest discarded. (2:433)
This is how it happens that an explanatory structure that a reader may see as tautological, in
that it can't help or can't stop or can't do anything other than proving the very same assump-
tions with which it began, may be experienced by the practitioner as a triumphant advance
toward truth and vindication.
More usually, however, the roles in this drama are more mixed or more widely distrib-
uted. I don't suppose that too many readers - nor, for that matter, perhaps the author - would
be too surprised to hear it noted that the main argument or "strong theory" of The Novel and
the Police is entirely circular: everything can be understood as an aspect of the carceral,
therefore the carceral is everywhere. But who reads The Novel and the Police to find out
whether its main argument is true? In this case, as also frequently in the case of the tautolo-
gies of "sexual difference," the very breadth of reach that makes the theory strong also offers
the space - of which this book takes every advantage - for a wealth of tonal nuance, attitude,
worldly observation, performative paradox, aggression, tenderness, wit, inventive reading,
obiter dicta, and writerly panache. These rewards are so local and frequent that one might
want to say that a plethora of only loosely related weak theories has been invited to shelter in
the hypertrophied embrace of the book's overarching strong theory. In many ways, such an
arrangement is all to the good - suggestive, pleasurable, and highly productive; an insistence
that everything means one thing somehow permits a sharpened sense of all the ways there
are of meaning it. But one need not read an infinite number of students' and other critics' de-
rivative rephrasings of the book's grimly strong theory to see, as well, some limitations of this
unarticulated relation between strong and weak theories. As strong theory, and as a locus of
reflexive mimeticism, paranoia is nothing if not teachable. The powerfully ranging and reduc-
tive force of strong theory can make tautological thinking hard to identify, even as it makes it
compelling and near-inevitable; the result is that both writers and readers can damagingly
misrecognize whether and where real conceptual work is getting done, and precisely what
that work might be.
(4) While Tomkins distinguishes among a number of qualitatively different affects, he
also for some purposes groups affects together loosely as the positive and the negative
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ones. In these terms, paranoia is characterized not only by being a strong theory as opposed
to a weak one, but by being a strong theory of a negative affect. This proves important in
terms of the overarching affective goals Tomkins sees as potentially conflicting with each
other in each individual: he distinguishes in the first place between the general goal of seek-
ing to minimize negative affect and that of seeking to maximize positive affect. (The other,
respectively more sophisticated goals he identifies are that affect inhibition be minimized,
and that the power to achieve the preceding three goals be maximized.) In most practices -
in most lives - there are small and subtle (though cumulatively powerful) negotiations be-
tween and among these goals; but the mushrooming, self-confirming strength of a monopo-
listic strategy of anticipating negative affect can have, according to Tomkins, the effect of
entirely blocking the potentially operative goal of seeking positive affect. "The only sense in
which [the paranoid] may strive for positive affect at all is for the shield which it promises
against humiliation," he writes. "To take seriously the strategy of maximizing positive affect,
rather than simply enjoying it when the occasion arises, is entirely out of the question"
(2:458-59).
Similarly, in Melanie Klein's writings from the 1940s and 1950s, it again represents an
actual achievement - a distinct, often risky positional shift - for an infant or adult to move to-
ward a sustained seeking of pleasure (through the reparative strategies of the depressive
position) , rather than continuing to pursue the self-reinforcing because self-defeating strate-
gies for forestalling pain offered by the paranoid/schizoid position. It's probably more usual
for discussions of the depressive position in Klein to emphasize that that position inaugurates
ethical possibility - in the form of a guilty, empathetic view of the other as at once good, dam-
aged, integral, and requiring and eliciting love and care. Such ethical possibility is, however,
founded on and coextensive with the subject's movement toward what Foucault calls "care of
the self," the often very fragile concern to provide the self with pleasure and nourishment in
an environment that is perceived not particularly to offer them.
Klein's and Tomkins's conceptual moves here are more sophisticated and, in an im-
portant way, less tendentious than the corresponding assumptions in Freud. To begin with,
Freud subsumes pleasure-seeking and pain-avoidance together under the rubric of the sup-
posedly primordial "pleasure principle," as though the two motives could not themselves
radically differ.16 Second, it is the pain-forestalling strategy alone in Freud that (as anxiety)
gets extended forward into the developmental achievement of the "reality principle." This
leaves pleasure-seeking as an always presumable, unexaminable, inexhaustible under-
ground wellspring of supposedly "natural" motive, one that presents only the question of how
to keep its irrepressible ebullitions under control. Perhaps even more problematically, this
Freudian schema silently installs the anxious paranoid imperative, the impossibility but also
the supposed necessity of forestalling pain and surprise, as "reality" - as the only and inevi-
table mode, motive, content, and proof of true knowledge.
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In Freud, then, there would be no room - except as an example of self-delusion - for
the Proustian epistemology whereby the narrator of A la recherche, who feels in the last vol-
ume "jostling each other within me a whole host of truths concerning human passions and
character and conduct," recognizes them as truths insofar as "the perception of [them]
caused me joy."17 In the paranoid Freudian epistemology, it is implausible enough to sup-
pose then that truth could be even an accidental occasion of joy; inconceivable to imagine
joy as a guarantor of truth. And indeed, from any point of view it is circular, or something, to
suppose that one's pleasure at knowing something could be taken as evidence of the truth of
the knowledge. But a strong theory of positive affect, such as the narrator seems to move
toward in Time Regained, is no more tautological than the strong theory of negative affect
represented by, for example, his paranoia in The Captive. (Indeed, to the extent that the pur-
suit of positive affect is far less likely to result in the formation of very strong theory, it may
tend rather less toward tautology.) Allow each theory its own, different prime motive, at any
rate - the anticipation of pain in one case, the provision of pleasure in the other - and neither
can be called more realistic than the other. It's not even necessarily true that the two make
different judgments of "reality": it isn't that one is pessimistic and sees the glass as half
empty, while the other is optimistic and sees it as half full. In a world full of loss, pain, and
oppression, both epistemologies are likely to be based on deep pessimism - the reparative
motive of seeking pleasure, after all, arrives, by Klein's account, only with the achievement of
a depressive position. But what each looks for - which is again to say, the motive each has
for looking - is bound to differ widely. Of the two, however, it is only paranoid knowledge that
has so thorough a practice of disavowing its affective motive and force, and masquerading
as the very stuff of truth.
(5) Whatever account it may give of its own motivation, paranoia is characterized by
placing, in practice, an extraordinary stress on the efficacy of knowledge per se - knowledge
in the form of exposure. Maybe that's why paranoid knowing is so inescapably narrative. Like
the deinstitutionalized person on the street who, betrayed and plotted against by everyone
else in the city, still urges on you the finger-worn dossier bristling with his precious corre-
spondence, paranoia for all its vaunted suspicion acts as though its work would be accom-
plished if only it could finally, this time, somehow get its story truly known. That a fully initi-
ated listener could still remain indifferent or inimical, or might have no help to offer, are hardly
treated as possibilities.
It's strange that a hermeneutic of suspicion would appear so trusting about the effects
of exposure, but Nietzsche (through the genealogy of morals), Marx (through the theory of
ideology), and Freud (through the theory of ideals and illusions) already represent, in Ri-
coeur's phrase, "convergent procedures of demystification" (34), and therefore a seeming
faith - inexplicable in their own terms - in the effects of such a proceeding. In the influential
final pages of Gender Trouble, for example, Butler offers a programmatic argument in favor
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of demystification as "the normative focus for gay and lesbian practice,"18 with such claims as
that "drag implicitly reveals the imitative structure of gender itself" (137); "we see sex and
gender denaturalized by means of a performance" (138); "gender parody reveals that the
original identity. . . is an imitation" (138); "gender performance will enact and reveal the per-
formativity of gender itself" (139); "parodic repetition. . . exposes the phantasmatic effect of
abiding identity" (141); "the parodic repetition of gender exposes. . . the illusion of gender
identity" (146); and "hyperbolic exhibitions of 'the natural' . . . reveal its fundamentally phan-
tasmatic status" (147) as well as "exposing its fundamental unnaturalness" (149; all empha-
ses added).
What marks the paranoid impulse in these pages is, I would say, less the stress on
reflexive mimesis than the seeming faith in exposure. The arch-suspicious author of The
Novel and the Police also speaks, in this case, for the protocols of many less interesting re-
cent critics when he offers to provide "the 'flash' of increased visibility necessary to render
modem discipline a problem in its own right" (ix) -as though to make something visible as a
problem were, if not a mere hop, skip, and jump away from getting it solved, at least self-
evidently a step in that direction. In this respect at least, though not in every one, Miller in
The Novel and the Police writes as an exemplary New Historicist. For to a startling extent,
the articulations of New Historicist scholarship rely on the prestige of a single, overarching
narrative: exposing and problematizing hidden violences in the genealogy of the modern lib-
eral subject.
With the passage of time since the New Historicism was new, it's becoming easier to
see ways in which such a paranoid project of exposure may be more historically specific than
it seems. "The modern liberal subject": in the latter I990s it seems, or at least ought to seem,
anything but an obvious choice as the unique terminus ad quem of historical narrative.
Where are all these supposed modern liberal subjects? I daily encounter graduate students
who are dab hands at unveiling the hidden historical violences that underlie a secular, uni-
versalist liberal humanism. Yet these students' sentient years - unlike the formative years of
their teachers - have been spent entirely in a xenophobic Reagan-Bush-Clinton America
where "liberal" is, if anything, a taboo category; and where "secular humanism" is routinely
treated as a marginal religious sect, while a vast majority of the population claims to engage
in direct intercourse with multiple invisible entities such as angels, Satan, and God.
Furthermore, the force of any interpretive project of unveiling hidden violence would
seem to depend on a cultural context, like the one assumed in Foucault's early works, in
which violence would be deprecated and hence hidden in the first place. Why bother expos-
ing the ruses of power in a country where, at any given moment, 40 percent of young black
men are enrolled in the penal system? In the United States and internationally, while there is
plenty of hidden violence that requires exposure, there is also, and increasingly, an ethos
where forms of violence that are hyper-visible from the start may be offered as an exemplary
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spectacle, rather than remaining to be unveiled as a scandalous secret. Human rights con-
troversy around, for example, torture and disappearances in Argentina, or the use of mass
rape as part of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, marks - not an unveiling of practices that had
been hidden or naturalized - but a wrestle of different frameworks of visibility. That is, vio-
lence that was from the beginning exemplary and spectacular, pointedly addressed, meant to
serve as a public warning or terror to members of a particular community, is combated by
efforts to displace and redirect (as well as simply expand) its aperture of visibility.
A further problem with these critical practices: what does a hermeneutic of suspicion
and exposure have to say to social formations in which visibility itself constitutes much of the
violence? The point of the move to reinstate chain gangs in several Southern states is less
that convicts be required to perform hard labor than that they be required to do so under the
gaze of the public; and the enthusiasm for Singapore-style justice that was popularly ex-
pressed in the United States around the caning of Michael Fay reveals a growing feeling that
well-publicized shaming stigma is just what the doctor ordered for recalcitrant youth. Here is
one remarkable index of historical change: it used to be opponents of capital punishment
who argued that, if practiced at all, executions should be done in public so as to shame state
and spectators by airing of the previously hidden judicial violence. Today it is no longer op-
ponents but death-penalty cheerleaders, flushed with triumphal ambitions, who consider that
the proper place for executions is on television. What price now the cultural critics' hard-won
skill at making visible, behind permissive appearances, the hidden traces of oppression and
persecution?
The paranoid trust in exposure seemingly depends, in addition, on an infinite reser-
voir of naïveté in those who make up the audience for these unveilings. What is the basis for
assuming that it will surprise or disturb - never mind motivate - anyone to learn that a given
social manifestation is artificial, self-contradictory, imitative, phantasmatic, or even violent?
As Peter Sloterdijk points out, cynicism or "enlightened false consciousness" - false con-
sciousness that knows itself to be false, "its falseness already reflexively buffered" - already
represents "the universally widespread way in which enlightened people see to it that they
are not taken for suckers."19 How television-starved would someone have to be to find it
shocking that ideologies contradict themselves, that simu- ( lacra don't have originals, or that
gender representations are artifical? My own guess would be that such popular cynicism,
while undoubtedly widespread, is only one among the heterogeneous, competing theories
that constitute the mental ecology of most people. Some exposes, some demystifications,
some bearings of witness do have great effectual force (though often of an unanticipated
kind). Many that are just as true and convincing have none at all, however; and as long as
that is so, we must admit that the efficacy and directionality of such acts reside somewhere
else than in their relation to knowledge per se.
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Writing in 1988 - that is, after two full terms of Reaganism in the United States - D. A.
Miller proposes to follow Foucault in demystifying "the intensive and continuous 'pastoral'
care that liberal society proposes to take of each and everyone of its charges" (viii). As if! I'm
a lot less worried about being pathologized by my shrink than about my vanishing mental
health coverage - and that's given the great good luck of having health insurance at all. Since
the beginning of the tax revolt, the government of the United States - and, increasingly, those
of other socalled liberal democracies - has been positively rushing to divest itself of answer-
ability for care to its charges (cf. "entitlement programs") - with no other institutions proposing
to fill in the gap. This development is the last thing anyone could have expected from reading
New Historicist prose, which constitutes a full genealogy of the secular welfare state that
peaked in the 1960s and 1970s, along with a watertight proof of why things must become
more and more like that forever. No one can blame a writer in the 1980s for not having fore-
seen the effects of the Republicans' 1994 Contract with America. But if, as Miller says, "Sur-
prise. . . is precisely what the paranoid seeks to eliminate," it must be admitted that, as a
form of paranoia, the New Historicism fails spectacularly. While its general tenor of "things
are bad and getting worse" is immune to refutation, any more specific predictive value - and
as a result, arguably, any value for making oppositional strategy - has been nil. Such accel-
erating failure to anticipate change is moreover, as we've discussed, entirely in the nature of
the paranoid process, whose sphere of influence (like that of the New Historicism itself) only
expands as each unanticipated disaster seems to demonstrate more conclusively that, guess
what, you can never be paranoid enough.
To look from a 1990s vantage at Richard Hofstadter's immensely influential 1963 es-
say, "The Paranoid Style in American Politics," is to see the extent of a powerful discursive
change. Hofstadter's essay is a prime expression of the complacent, coercive liberal consen-
sus that practically begs for the kind of paranoid demystification in which, for example, D. A.
Miller educates his readers. Its style is mechanically evenhanded: Hofstadter finds paranoia
on both left and right (among abolitionists, anti-Masons and anti-Catholics and anti-Mormons,
nativists and Populists and those who believe in conspiracies of bankers or munitions-
makers; in anyone who doubts that JFK was killed by a lone gunman, "in the popular left-
wing press, in the contemporary American right wing, and on both sides of the race contro-
versy today") .20 Although these categories would seem to cover a lot of people, there re-
mains nonetheless a presumptive "we" - apparently still practically everyone - that can agree
to view such extremes from a calm, understanding, and encompassing middle ground, where
"we" can all agree that, for example, while "innumerable decisions of. . . the cold war can be
faulted," they represent "simply the mistakes of well-meaning men" (36). Hofstadter has no
trouble admitting that paranoid people or movements can perceive true things, though "a
distorted style is. . . a possible signal that may alert us to a distorted judgment, just as in art
an ugly style is a cue to fundamental defects of taste" (6).
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A few simple and relatively non-controversial examples may make [the distinction be-
tween content and style] wholly clear. Shortly after the assassination of President
Kennedy, a great deal of publicity was given to a bill . . . to tighten federal controls
over the sale of firearms through the mail. When hearings were being held on the
measure,three men drove 2,500 miles to Washington from Bagdad, Arizona, to testify
against it. Now there are arguments against the Dodd bill which, however unpersua-
sive one may find them, have the color of conventional political reasoning. But one of
the Arizonans opposed it with what might be considered representative paranoid ar-
guments, insisting that it was "a further attempt by a subversive power to make us
part of one world socialistic government" and that it threatened to "create chaos" that
would help "our enemies" to seize power. (5)
I won't deny that a person could get nostalgic for a time when paranoid gun-lobby rhetoric
sounded just plain nutty - a "simple and relatively non-controversial" example of "distorted
judgment" - rather than representing the uncontested platform of a dominant political party.
But the spectacular datedness of Hofstadter's example isn't only an index of how far the
American political center has shifted toward the right since 1963. It's also a sign of how nor-
mative such paranoid thinking has become at every point in the political spectrum. In a funny
way, I feel closer today to that paranoid Arizonan than I do to Hofstadter - even though (or do
I mean because?) I also assume that the Arizonan is a homophobic whitesupremacist Chris-
tian Identity militia member who would as soon blow me away as look at me. Peter Sloterdijk
does not make explicit that the wised-up popular cynicism or "enlightened false conscious-
ness" that he considers now to be near-ubiquitous is, specifically, paranoid in structure; but
that conclusion seems inescapable. Arguably, such narrow-gauge, everyday, rather incoher-
ent cynicism is what paranoia looks like when it functions as weak theory rather than strong
theory. To keep arriving on this hyper-demystified, paranoid scene with the "news" of a her-
meneutic of suspicion, at any rate, is a far different act than such exposures would have
been in the 1960S.
Subversive and demystifying parody, suspicious archaeologies of the present, the detection
of hidden patterns of violence and their exposure: as I have been arguing, these infinitely
doable and teachable protocols of unveiling have become the common currency of cultural
and historicist studies. If there is an obvious danger in the triumphalism of a paranoid herme-
neutic, it is that the broad consensual sweep of such methodological assumptions, the cur-
rent near-profession-wide agreement about what constitutes narrative or explanation or ade-
quate historicization, may, if it persists unquestioned, unintentionally impoverish the gene
pool of literary-critical perspectives and skills. The trouble with a narrow gene pool, of course,
20
is its diminished to environmental (for instance, political) change.
Another, perhaps more nearly accurate way of describing the present paranoid con-
sensus, however, is that rather than entirely displacing, it may simply have required a certain
disarticulation, disavowal, and misrecognition of other ways of knowing - ways less oriented
around suspicion - that are actually being practiced, often by the same theorists and as part
of the same projects. The monopolistic program of paranoid knowing systematically disallows
any explicit recourse to reparative motives, no sooner to be articulated than subject to me-
thodical uprooting. Reparative motives, once they become explicit, are inadmissable within
paranoid theory both because they are about pleasure ("merely aesthetic") and because they
are frankly ameliorative ("merely reformist") .21 What makes pleasure and amelioration so
"mere"? Only the exclusiveness of paranoia's faith in demystifying exposure: only its cruel
and contemptuous assumption that the one thing lacking for global revolution, explosion of
gender roles, or whatever, is people's (that is, other people's) having the painful effects of
their oppression, poverty, or deludedness sufficiently exacerbated to make the pain con-
scious (as if otherwise it wouldn't have been) and intolerable (as if intolerable situations were
famous for generating excellent solutions).
Such ugly prescriptions are not seriously offered by most paranoid theory; but a lot of
contemporary theory is nonetheless regularly structured as if by them. The kind of aporia we
have already discussed in The Novel and the Police, where readers are impelled through a
grimly monolithic structure of strong paranoid theory by successive engagement with quite
varied, often apparently keenly pleasure-oriented, smaller-scale writerly and intellectual so-
licitations, appears in a lot of other good criticism as well. I certainly recognize it as charac-
terizing a fair amount of my own writing. Does it matter when such projects misdescribe
themselves or are misrecognized by readers? I wouldn't suggest that the force of any power-
ful writing can ever attain complete transparency to itself, or is likely to account for itself very
adequately at the constative level of the writing. But suppose one takes seriously a notion -
like the one articulated by Tomkins, but also like other available ones - that everyday theory
qualitatively affects everyday knowledge and experience; and suppose that one doesn't want
to draw much ontological distinction between academic theory and everyday theory; and
suppose that one has a lot of concern for the quality of other people's and one's own prac-
tices of knowing and experiencing. In these cases, it would make sense - if one had the
choice - not to cultivate the necessity of a systematic, self-accelerating split between what
one is doing and the reasons for which one does it.
To change one's understanding of the reasons for one's practice, or the meanings of
one's practice - is it, or is it not, under this understanding of theory, to change one's practice?
I ask this question seriously, and I take it to be a productive, overarching rubric under which
to approach the essays in the present volume. There's a built-in gracelessness to the expec-
tation that any essay will end with an explanation of exactly what it is that the writer is "calling
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for." ("Calling for," as if critical practices were ready-made consumer items among which one
had only to choose - "Mabel, Black Label!" Or maybe as if one were a doctor, whose expen-
sive expertise goes into the writing of the right prescription, leaving to some commercial func-
tionary the work of filling it as ordered. ) That gracelessness can only be amplified when the
essay in question is an introduction to other essays by other writers: as if any one person
either had all along anticipated, or were now in a position to sum up and adjudicate, so rich a
diversity of projects. My prescription - or really, I think, my proposition - here is very modest:
that our work grows more interesting, more responsive, more truthful, and more useful as we
try to account for its motives in a less stylized fashion than we have been. Perhaps the un-
packing, above, of several different elements of paranoid thought can suggest several spe-
cific, divergent dimensions in which alternative approaches may also be available - may in-
deed be in practice in these pages.
While paranoid theoretical proceedings both depend upon and reinforce the structural
dominance of monopolistic "strong theory," there may also be benefit in exploring the ex-
tremely varied, dynamic, and historically contingent ways that strong theoretical constructs
interact with weak ones in the ecology of knowing - an exploration that obviously can't pro-
ceed without a respectful interest in weak as well as strong theoretical acts. Tomkins offers
far more models for approaching such a project than I've been able to summarize. But the
history of literary criticism can also be viewed as a repertoire of alternative models for allow-
ing strong and weak theory to interdigitate. One notable feature of Novel Gazing, for exam-
ple, is the centrality in so many of these essays of an unhurried, undefensive, theoretically
galvanized practice of close reading. What could better represent "weak theory, little better
than a description of the phenomena which it purports to explain" than this devalued and
nearobsolescent New Critical skill?22 But what was already true in Empson and Burke is true
in a different way in these essays: there are important and theoretical tasks that can be ac-
complished only local theories and nonce taxonomies; the potentially innumerable mecha-
nisms of their relation to stronger theories remains the matter and speculative thought.
Paranoia, as we have pointed out, represents not only a strong affect theory but a
strong negative affect theory. A strong theory (that is, a wideranging and reductive one) that
was not mainly organized around anticipating, identifying, and warding off the negative affect
of humiliation would resemble paranoia in some respects, but differ from it in others. I think,
for example, that that might be a fair characterization of the preceding section of the present
essay. The question of the strength of a given theory (or that of the relations between strong
and weak theory) may be orthogonal to the question of its affective quale, and each may be
capable of exploration by different means. It does seem to me that the most powerful pieces
in this collection - even profoundly sad pieces skill readers at attending to, rather than having
to disavow, the workings of positive affect in projects where only negative affect theories
have so far had much structuring force.
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Since even the specification of paranoia as a theory of negative affect leaves open
the distinctions between or among negative affects, there is the additional opportunity of ex-
perimenting with a vocabulary that will do justice to a wide affective range. Again, not only
with the negative affects: it can also be reifying and, indeed, coercive to have only one, total-
izing model of positive affect always in the same featured position. A disturbingly large
amount of theory seems explicitly to undertake the proliferation of only one affect or maybe
two, of whatever kind - whether ecstasy, sublimity, self-shattering, jouissance, suspicion,
abjection, knowingness, horror, grim satisfaction, or righteous indignation. It's like the old
joke: "Comes the revolution, Comrade, everyone gets to eat roast beef every day." "But
Comrade, I don't like roast beef." "Comes the revolution, Comrade, you'll like roast beef."
Comes the revolution, Comrade, you'll be tickled pink by those deconstructive jokes; you'll
faint from ennui every minute that you're not smashing the state apparatus; you'll definitely
want hot sex twenty to thirty times a day. You'll be mournful and militant. You'll never want to
tell Deleuze and Guattari, "Not tonight, dears, I have a headache."
To recognize in paranoia a distinctively rigid relation to temporality, at once anticipa-
tory and retroactive, averse above all to surprise, is also to glimpse the lineaments of other
possibilities. Here, perhaps, Klein is of more help than Tomkins: to read from a reparative
position is to surrender the knowing, anxious paranoid determination that no horror, however
apparently unthinkable, shall ever come to the reader as new: to a reparatively positioned
reader, it can seem realistic and necessary to experience surprise. Because there can be
terrible surprises, however, there can also be good ones. Hope, often a fracturing, even a
traumatic thing to experience, is among the energies by which the reparatively positioned
reader tries to organize the fragments and part-objects she encounters or creates.23 Because
she has room to realize that the future may be different from the present, it is also possible
for her to entertain such profoundly painful, profoundly relieving, ethically crucial possibilities
as that the past, in turn, could have happened differently from the way it actually did.24
Where does this argument leave projects of queer reading, in particular? With the
relative deemphasis of the question of "sexual difference" and sexual "sameness," and with
the possibility of moving from a Freudian, homophobia-centered understanding of paranoia
to other understandings of it, like Klein's or Tomkins's, that are not particularly Oedipal and
are less drive-oriented than affect-oriented, I am also suggesting that the mutual inscription
of queer thought with the topic of paranoia may be less necessary, less definitional, less
completely constitutive than earlier writing on it, very much including my own, has assumed.
A more ecological view of paranoia wouldn't offer the same transhistorical, almost automatic
conceptual privileging of gay/lesbian issues that is offered by a Freudian view.
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On the other hand, I think it will leave us in a vastly better position to do justice to a
wealth of characteristic, culturally central practices, many of which can well be called repara-
tive, that emerge from queer experience but become invisible or illegible under a paranoid
optic. As Joseph Litvak writes, for example,
It seems to me that the importance of "mistakes" in queer reading and writing. . . has
a lot to do with loosening the traumatic, inevitable-seeming connection between mis-
takes and humiliation. What I mean is that, if a lot of queer energy, say around ado-
lescence, goes into what Barthes calls "le vouloir-etre-intelligent" (as in "If I have to
be miserable, at least let me be brainier than everybody else") , accounting in large
part for paranoia's enormous prestige as the very signature of smartness (a smart-
ness that smarts), a lot of queer energy, later on, goes into. . . practices aimed at tak-
ing the terror out of error, at making the making of mistakes sexy, creative, even cog-
nitively powerful. Doesn't reading queer mean learning, among other things, that mis-
takes can be good rather than bad surprises?25
It's appropriate, I think, that these insights would be contingent developments, rather than
definitional or transhistorical ones - they aren't things that would inevitably inhere in the ex-
perience of every woman-loving woman or man-loving man, say. For if, as we've shown, a
paranoid reading practice is closely tied to a notion of the inevitable, there are, as this dem-
onstrates, other features of queer reading that can attune it exquisitely to a heartbeat of con-
tingency.
The dogged, defensive narrative stiffness of a paranoid temporality, after all, in which
yesterday can't be allowed to have differed from today and tomorrow must be even more so,
takes its shape from a generational narrative that's characterized by a distinctly Oedipal
regularity and repetitiveness: it happened to my father's father, it happened to my father, it is
happening to me, it will happen to my son, and it will happen to my son's son. But isn't it a
feature of queer possibility - only a contingent feature, but a real one, and one that in turn
strengthens the force of contingency itself - that our generational relations don't always pro-
ceed in this lockstep ?
Think of the epiphanic, extravagantly reparative final volume of Proust, in which the
narrator, after a long withdrawal from society, goes to a party where he at first thinks every-
one is sporting elaborate costumes pretending to be ancient - then realizes that they are old,
and so is he - and is then assailed, in half a dozen distinct mnemonic shocks, by a climactic
series of joy-inducing "truths" about the relation of writing to time. The narrator never says
so, but isn't it worth pointing out that the complete temporal disorientation that initiates him
into this revelatory space would have been impossible in a heterosexual pere de famille, in
one who had meanwhile been embodying, in the form of inexorably "progressing" identities
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and roles, the regular arrival of children and grandchildren?
And now I began to understand what old age was - old age, which perhaps of all the
realities is the one of which we preserve for longest in our life a purely abstract con-
ception, looking at calendars, dating our letters, seeing our friends marry and then in
their turn the children of our friends, and yet, either from fear or from sloth, not under-
standing what all this means, until the day when we behold an unknown silhouette. . .
which teaches us that we are living in a new world; until the day when a grandson of
a woman we once knew, a young man whom instinctively we treat as a contemporary
of ours, smiles as though we were making fun of him because it seems that we are
old enough to be his grandfather- and I began to understand too what death meant
and love and the joys of the spiritual life, the usefulness of suffering, a vocation, etc.
(3 : 354-55)26
A more recent and terrible contingency, in the brutal foreshortening of so many queer
lifespans, has deroutinized the temporality of many of us in ways that only intensify this ef-
fect. I'm thinking, as I say this, of three very queer friendships I have. One of my friends is
sixty; the other two are both thirty, and I, at forty-five, am exactly in the middle. All four of us
are academics, and we have in common a lot of interests, energies, and ambitions; we have
each had, as well, variously intense activist investments. In a "normal" generational narrative,
our identifications with each other would be aligned with an expectation that in another fifteen
years, I'd be situated comparably to where my sixty-year-old friend is, while my thirty-year-old
friends would be situated comparably to where I am.
But we are all aware that the grounds of such friendships today are likely to differ
from that model. They do so in inner cities, and for people subject to racist violence, and for
people deprived of health care, and for people in dangerous industries, and for many others;
they do for my friends and me. Specifically, living with advanced breast cancer, I have little
chance of ever being the age my older friend is now. My friends who are thirty years old are
similarly unlikely ever to experience my present, middle age: one is living with an advanced
cancer caused by a massive environmental trauma (basically, he grew up on top of a toxic
waste site); the other is living with HIV. The friend who is a very healthy sixty is the likeliest of
us to be living fifteen years from now.
It's hard to say, hard even to know, how these relationships are different from those
shared by people of different ages on a landscape whose perspectival lines converge on a
common disappearing-point. I'm sure ours are more intensely motivated: whatever else we
know, we know there isn't time to bullshit. But what it means to identify with each other must
also be very different. On this scene, an older person doesn't love a younger as someone
who will someday be where she now is, or vice versa. No one is, so to speak, carrying for-
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ward the family name; there's a sense in which our life narratives will barely overlap. There's
another sense in which they slide up more intimately alongside one another than can any
lives that are moving forward according to the regular schedule of the generations. It is one
another immediately, one another as the present fullness of a becoming whose arc may ex-
tend no further, whom we each must learn best to apprehend, fulfill, and bear company.
At a textual level, it seems to me that related practices of reparative knowing may lie,
barely recognized and little explored, at the heart of many histories of gay, lesbian, and
queer intertextuality. The queeridentified practice of camp, for example, may be seriously
misrecognized when it is viewed, as Butler and others view it, through paranoid lenses. As
we've seen, camp is currently understood as uniquely appropriate to the projects of parody,
denaturalization, demystification, and mocking exposure of the elements and assumptions of
a dominant culture; and the degree to which camping is motivated by love seems often to be
understood mainly as the degree of its self-hating complicity with an oppressive status quo.
By this account, the X-ray gaze of the paranoid impulse in camp sees through to an un-
fleshed skeleton of the culture; the paranoid aesthetic on view here is one of minimalist ele-
gance and conceptual economy.
The desire of a reparative impulse, on the other hand, is additive and accretive. Its
fear, a realistic one, is that the culture surrounding it is inadequate or inimical to its nurture; it
wants to assemble and confer plenitude on an object that will then have resources to offer to
an inchoate self. To view camp as, among other things, the communal, historically dense
exploration of a variety of reparative practices is to be able to be able to do better justice to
many of the defining elements of classic camp performance: the startling, juicy displays of
excess erudition, for example; the passionate, often hilarious antiquarianism, the prodigal
production of alternate historiographies; the "over"-attachment to fragmentary, marginal,
waste, or leftover products; the rich, highly interruptive affective variety; the irrepressible fas-
cination with ventriloquistic experimentation; the disorienting juxtapositions of present with
past, and popular with high culture. As in the writing of D. A. Miller, a glue of surplus beauty,
surplus stylistic investment, unexplained upwellings of threat, contempt, and longing cements
together and animates the amalgam of powerful part-objects in such work as that of Ronald
Firbank, Djuna Barnes, Joseph Cornell, Kenneth Anger, Charles Ludlam, Jack Smith, John
Waters, Holly Hughes.
The very mention of these names, some of them attaching to almost legendarily
"paranoid" personalities, confirms, too, Klein's insistence that it is not people but mutable
positions - or, I would want to add, practices - that can be divided between the paranoid and
the reparative; it is sometimes the most paranoid-tending people who are able to, and need
to, develop and disseminate the richest reparative practices. And if the paranoid or the de-
pressive positions operate on a smaller scale than the level of individual typology, they oper-
ate also on a larger, that of shared histories, emergent communities, and the weaving of in-
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tertextual discourse.
At the beginning of this introduction, I undertook a list of some influential dichotomies and
reifications that the essays collected here, individually and cumulatively, seem to suggest
exciting ways of doing without. The organization of the book - perhaps appropriately contin-
gent - is meant to dramatize what could, in another connection, seem a series of oxymoronic
conjunctions: digitality with physical touch, affect with economics, pedagogy with wild ani-
mals, mama's boys with fatherlands, desire with cognition.
The title of this book's first part, "Digital Senses," can oddly seem both oxymoron and
tautology. With what, for example, would one think to exercise one's senses if not with fin-
gers? Yet the still-popular use of human fingers as a cheap and user-friendly computational
technology has also come to seem the very definitional opposite of the disembodied, infi-
nitely abstract realm now called digital. To begin this collection with Kathryn Bond Stockton's
essay, “Prophylactics and Brains: Beloved in the Cybernetic Age of AIDS," is however to be
invited by a universe of speculation and feeling in which the parasitic demand of "informa-
tion" to be transmitted, of codes to be decoded, and thought to be thought, is entirely inter-
folded with the yearning and mortification of the skin, and the imperious bodily structurations
of grievous memory and historic trauma.
With the next essay, Joseph Litvak turns from touch toward taste. In "Strange Gour-
met: Taste, Waste, Proust," he undertakes to delineate something like "an object-relations
theory" of sophistication, "a theory that will explain how sophistication maps out a certain
fantasmatic way of circulating in and around the world - not, as may seem to be the case, of
simply rising above it but, at least in Proust's case, of connecting the 'high' and the 'low' so as
to short-circuit the middle." In proper Kleinian fashion, Litvak approaches Proust through a
narrative of the gullet, emphasizing good and bad mouth-objects and complex inner pleas-
ures (the "stranger" or gamier - that is to say, the "higher"- the better). If you aren't squeam-
ish about digestive processes, then there's always a sense in which you can eat your cake
and have it, too; "re-senting, re-tasting, re-finding the badness of the bad object, saving that
badness from falling into the mere banality of the merely deidealized, [has] the additional
virtue, in other words, of helping one save oneself."
Returning to the fingers, "Outing Texture," Renu Bora's deeply original essay on The
Ambassadors, offers theoretical tools at once for an erotics and a metaphysics of texture.
Occupying "the borders of properties of touch and vision," texture dramatizes both the dis-
junctures and displacements between the two senses (as in certain traditions of understand-
ing fetishism), and their common materialities. Another tension: texture, as surfacial, can sig-
nify the exact opposite of structure; while texture, as structure (think of sand, brick, feces),
can also offer the most graphic sensual manifestation of the immanence of production proc-
esses and histories. Bora touches both on the objects in James - fabrics and bibelots, as well
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as erotic objects - and on the narrative touch of "James" himself: what, Bora finally asks, is
the texture of innuendo?
In "The 'Sinister Fruitiness' of Machines: Neuromancer, Internet Sexuality, and the
Turing Test," Tyler Curtain returns us to the airier digitality of cyberspace. His essay frames
newly the question, What kind of crisis is it that the digital revolution makes for understand-
ings of personhood? In the fiction of William Gibson, in the cruisy salons of the Internet, and -
most explosively - in the benchmark Turing test itself, Curtain explores ways that gender as
well as sexuality may drive definitional wedges between the two terms, "humanness" and
"intelligence."
Jeff Nunokawa's essay, "The Importance of Being Bored: The Dividens of Ennui in
The Picture of Dorian Gray," introduces "The Affective Life of Capital," the second part of
Novel Gazing. While no one would be surprised to learn that capitalism depends on generat-
ing interest, Nunokawa's project here is to show how fully it also depends on generating te-
dium. More specifically, it is consumer culture whose relation to boredom is articulated
through a (paradoxically fascinating) reading of "the intimacy between advertising and aes-
thetics" in Wilde - and between both of these and a centuries-long, sublimatory tradition of
male intergenerational desire.
Michael Lucey points out early in his essay, "Balzac's Queer Cousins and Their
Friends," that Balzac is one of the novelists who can seem most to fuse into one totalizing,
seamless whole the "two projects" of hegemonic power: "portraying a world, and helping su-
ture us to it." Lucey's essay, however, while it is interested in such "parallels," is most inter-
ested in maintaining them as parallel - that is, in attending to and making use of the irreduci-
ble distances that live between the lines. Between the needs of a system called "family" and
the needs of a system of capital accumulation there are also such parallels, condensed for
instance in the Foucauldian concept of "alliance." Lucey is drawn to Cousin Bette and Cousin
Pons because the novels center on "bachelor and spinster cousins, family misfits and re-
mainders," "parasitic on the family, yet also radically other to it." He is also, however, sharply
yet ambivalently drawn into Balzac's disavowed solicitations for the reader to interpret Bette's
and Pons's ontologies precisely as sexual. "The slack in the cord that links sentiment or af-
fect or sexuality to family structure" is, as he shows, the place of a crucially contingent cross-
ing between perverse sexual itineraries and circuitous economic trajectories.
"Teacher's Pet" is the rubric for the book's third part; I wish there were an easy tech-
nology for wafting into its pages the strains of the song as Doris Day performs it. That peda-
gogy can be a very sexy matter was no more news to Rousseau than to Plato or Dante. But
as Anne Chandler shows in her essay about an influential disciple of Rousseau's, "Defying
'Development': Thomas Day's Queer Curriculum in Sandford and Merton," the desires that
cement a teacher to his job may not consort intelligibly with the developmental narrative that
implicitly underwrites such intimacy. Sandford and Merton was not only as famous a book in
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its time as Emile, but, improbably, an even weirder one. Chandler's patient closeness to this
text, at once dry, playful, and erotically generous, seems to offer a new model of how one
might respect the alterity of a distant moment without reifying temporal distance as alterity:
without reinscribing wishful or oversimplifying presumptions about what the present is like,
and without disavowing the unexpected currents that may jolt between present and past.
As I've suggested above, there may be resonant homologies between this queer way
of risking historical “anachronism,” on the one hand, and on the other hand that intimate
anachronism by which a queer grown-up can sometimes keep drawing on the energies, in-
credulities, and discoveries of an earlier moment of passionate, incompetent reading and
recognition. For many queer readers of the latter twentieth century, I think, the Arthurian nar-
ratives of T. H. White, especially The Once and Future King (dramatized in Camelot), con-
dense the two modes of anachronism in an almost unbearably piquant way. Barry Weller
returns to these formative childhood texts in "Wizards, Warriors, and the Beast Glatisant in
Love." He discusses the remarkably wide range of invitations (to identify, to desire) that
White offers the young reader. While some of these - I want to call them "versions of pas-
toral," but by that I would still mean "versions of queerness" - are frankly homoerotic and/or
pederastic, the ones that prove most productive are, unexpectedly, those that dramatize the
crossing between species. "What Arthur's excursions into the animal kingdom offer him,"
Weller observes, "is an open-ended variety of erotic connections and political regimes, with
the corollary that no single ordering of human affairs is right or final."
In "Forged in Crisis: Queer Beginnings of Modern Masculinity in a Canonical French
Novel," James Creech also returns (reparatively?) to the moment of a younger reader's
queer recognition. Here his focus is not, like Weller's, on what he didn't know about a chil-
dren's book, but rather on what ''as a gay reader I have always 'known"' - even as "it has
been impossible to find an explanation or an expression" for such out-of-place or premature
knowledge - about one of the classic texts of French studies, Benjamin Constant's Adolphe.
That "these frightened and fragile gestures of queer self-recognition . . . be taken seriously,"
and even come to be supported by "a rich texture of spontaneous presumption," is part of
Creech's project; another part is to suggest a queer male genealogy alternative to the popu-
lar narrative of the eternal smother-mother. One of the most dystopian of T. H. White's twen-
tieth-century versions of pastoral, as Barry Weller notes, is a quasi-incestuous overstress of
the bond between mother and son. Creech shows that at Constant's earlier, post-
Revolutionary European moment, "the maternal term is not yet the given onto which primary
homosexual incest can be displaced or projected. In this period, the crisis of masculinity can
still be located, conceptually, within a male context, and the crisis of heterosexual experience
emerges as its extension."
I wonder whether in these introductory notes, as I've several times invoked moments
or flashes of queer recognition, such invocations may not have implicitly borrowed a certain
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humanistic, Buberian or Winnicottian gravity from the moral prestige of the face - and in par-
ticular, of the encounter between one face and another. Yet the recognitions implicit in queer
pedagogy do not always conform to the missionary position. One Victorian headmaster, for
example, was famous for being unable to recognize his former students when he could see
only their faces. "The traffic between and among faces and butts stimulates meaning produc-
tion while troubling what it means to be legible," notes John Vincent in his extraordinarily
suggestive essay, "Flogging is Fundamental: Applications of Birch in Swinburne's Lesbia
Brandon." Charting the many ways that an erotics of flogging can be misrecognized - swept
out of sight and mind, for example, under the more familiar rubrics of masochism, of anality,
of pederasty, or even just of "pain" - Vincent applies himself vigorously to the surfaces of
Swinburne's writing, stimulating the sense of both the specificity and the wild dilativeness of
the topic.
The fourth part of the book, "Men and Nations," is the only one that specifies a gen-
der in its emphasis on the political bearings of a masculinity marked by the historical particu-
larization of sexuality. The tour de force performed by Jacob Press in his essay, "Same-Sex
Unions in Modern Europe: Daniel Deronda, Altneuland, and the Homoerotics of Jewish Na-
tionalism," is a thoroughgoing, novelistic reading of early Zionism as and through a European
crisis of masculine sexuality. It hasn't been widely appreciated, for example, that Max Nor-
dau, inventor of a theory of "degeneration" whose anti-Semitic as well as homophobic bear-
ings have reached so gruesomely into the present century, was himself not only Jewish but
in fact an important Zionist founder. Through readings of and around Daniel Deronda and
Theodor Herzl's visionary Zionist novel, Altneuland, Press makes it possible to understand
such juxtapositions less as paradoxical than as axiomatic.
In a bravura reading of Gentlemen's Agreement, a best-selling American middlebrow
novel (1946) and film (1947), Cindy Patton returns to the topic of Jewish masculinity as a
crossing-point between sexuality and national citizenship. The then-new postwar genre of the
"problem" novel/film, Patton shows, characteristically treated homophobia and anti-Semitism
as interchangeable "problems." The title of Patton's essay, "To Die For," evokes the question
suggested by Benedict Anderson, the theorist of nationality: what are the affective mecha-
nisms by which "dying for one's country, which usually one does not choose, assumes a
moral grandeur which dying for the Labour Party, the American Medical Association, or per-
haps even Amnesty International cannot rival"? Patton discusses how the prescribed struc-
tures of empathetic vicariation in the "problem" genres may have inflected the developing
relationship between sexual identity and national identity; such skilled affective processes,
she argues, may offer both a truer and a more radical postwar genealogy for gay politics than
does the usual explanatory recourse to McCarthyite repression.
Robert F. Reid-Pharr is concerned with liminal and mythic, as well as with historically
local manifestations of crisis, possession, and scapegoating in "Tearing the Goat's Flesh:
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Homosexuality, Abjection, and the Production of a Late-Twentieth-Century Black Masculin-
ity." Like Patton, however, he sets his sights toward the politics of a specific construction of
positive affect: in this case the joy and excitement (far more than simply the functionalist res-
toration of equilibrium) that circulate around the process of abjecting the bodies and souls of
African American gay men. Through new framings of Eldridge Cleaver's Soul on Ice, Piri
Thomas's Down These Mean Streets, and James Baldwin's Giovanni's Room, Reid-Pharr
reads through the far lenses of the texts' absences, in search of the "perverse" ghosts that
will "parallel[ ] the absence of the black from Western notions of rationality and humanity
while at the same time pointing to the possibility of escape from this same black-exclusive
system of logic."
The title of the final part of this book, "Libidinal Intelligence: Shocks and Recogni-
tions," comes from Joseph Litvak's earlier essay, in which he discusses the potential uses of
Proustian anachronism as one seeks "a model for recapturing not so much a lost world as a
lost libidinal intelligence, a capacity for having more than a blandly routinized relation to any
world. Reading Proust can induce a fantasy of being Proust. That fantasy keeps faith with a
fantasmatic faculty itself: with, to amend Adomo, a childhood potential not so much for unim-
paired experience as for making bad-that is to say, as Proust himself would say, good - ob-
ject choices." The shock of the strange, as it is denominated by Jonathan Goldberg's essay-
title as well as Litvak's own, records the shape of a need for fantasy to "keep[ ] faith with a
fantasmatic faculty itself." The uncanny shock of strangeness is only one step to the side of
what we have been calling the shock of queer recognition; but the epithet "strange" also
marks a stubborn Taurean refusal to accede to the requirement that objects be designated
"bad" or "good" at all.
"Dancing books" is the generic designation Maurice Wallace coins to describe Melvin
Dixon's Vanishing Rooms; the phrase, the entire inquiry, seem to open realms. Kinesthetic
habits, rhythms, shocks, and explorations have a mind and indeed a memory of their own.
The project of Wallace's essay, "The Autochoreography of an Ex-Snow Queen: Dance, De-
sire, and the Black Masculine in Melvin Dixon's Vanishing Rooms," is to do justice to a cer-
tain kinesthetic challenge in and around Dixon's novel. It suggests that under the heavy, dis-
torting ether of homophobic Pressure and racist hyperembodiment, human movement
through space may be the only form of truth-telling about the misrecognitions - indeed as well
the veritable recognitions -involved in the loves, betrayals, and desires between an African
American man and a white man.
It might make sense to describe as a "dancing essay" Stephen Barber's discussion of
The Years and Between the Acts in "Lip-Reading: Woolf's Secret Encounters." If this is danc-
ing, however, it is secret and for that matter strange dancing: the dance of lips, fingers, eyes.
Digital dancing maybe, it signifies the brush of recognitions that both strain toward language
and systematically elude it. Specifically these "unnarrativizable miracles" are the slantwise
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recognitions that pass between women and gay men, which, as Barber shows, became criti-
cal for Virginia Woolf as the loss of Lytton Strachey steadily deepened for her in the decade
after his death. "He was so good to me / Who's going to make me gay, now?" Barber quotes
Nina Simone; in an essay whose ethical bearing is shockingly frontal, he also quotes Gayatri
Spivak: "Ethics is the experience of the impossible."
"The deftness of a woman's fingers on ivory" is only one of the pungent images with
which, in "The Female World of Exorcism and Displacement (Or, Relations between women
in Henry James's Nineteenth-Century The Portrait of a Lady)," Melissa Solomon marks "the
growing telepathy of sensual reading" between Isabel Archer and Madame Merle in The Por-
trait of a Lady. As the title of her essay suggests, Solomon is interested in how utterly "the
sharpened pincers" of characters' and readers' "subliminal" lesbian insight can reorganize
both a received, heterosexist view of the novel's performative space, and a received, ano-
dyne view of the eroticism and promise that pulse between women. "Within this ontology,"
Solomon points out, "perception itself. . . is frightfully at stake, and one scrambles to employ
the finely calibrated senses of taste, touch, and smell."
In "Strange Brothers," finally, Jonathan Goldberg feels his way back to the shock of a
first encounter with the prose of Willa Cather - "as if, somehow, the novels were written in a
language which I could not myself articulate and yet in which I found myself articulated." In
retroactive explanation, Goldberg invokes a famous phrase from Cather's manifesto on "The
Novel Démeublé"; and it is as if his essay, a reading of The Professor's House, were itself a
meditation on, and in the beautiful mode of, unfurnishedness. Goldberg forges instruments
for registering the recognitions that vibrate through certain quiet vicariations and spare identi-
fications: those, for example, through which the love of Edith Lewis narrates Cather's
"strange" at-homeness with a challenging anachronistic space.
What Joseph Litvak, in his essay, refers to as "gay alchemy" represents a wild, cun-
ning, and flamboyant refusal of the either/or. Like Proust, the reader "helps himself again and
again"; as all these essays show, it is not only important but possible to find ways of attend-
ing to such reparative motives and positionalities. The vocabulary for articulating any reader's
reparative motive toward a text or a culture has long been so sappy, aestheticizing, defen-
sive, anti-intellectual, or reactionary that it's no wonder few critics are willing to describe their
acquaintance with such motives. The prohibitive problem, however, has been in the limita-
tions of present theoretical vocabularies rather than in the reparative motive itself. No less
acute than a paranoid position, no less realistic, no less attached to a project of survival, and
neither less nor more delusional or fantasmatic, the reparative reading position undertakes a
different range of affects, ambitions, and risks. What we can best learn from such practices
are, perhaps, the many ways in which selves and communities succeed in extracting suste-
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